Financial Incentives, Efforts, and Performances in the Health Sector: Experimental Evidence from the Democratic Republic of Congo
Huillery, Elise; Seban, Juliette (2019), Financial Incentives, Efforts, and Performances in the Health Sector: Experimental Evidence from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Economic Development and Cultural Change. 10.1086/703235
TypeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
Journal nameEconomic Development and Cultural Change
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Abstract (EN)Financial incentives for service providers are increasingly used in developing countries as atool to maximize the effort and output of public providers. Using a field experiment in theDRC, we evaluate the impact of a fee-for-service mechanism aimed to increase health serviceutilization. We find that, relative to fixed payments, the fee-for-service mechanism slightlydecreased service utilization. We show that these detrimental effects of incentives do notresult from a diminution in workers' efforts, fraud, or switching away from non-incentivizedactions. But workers’ intrinsic motivation decreased and their efforts were evidentlymisplaced, showing that incentivized workers are not always more productive because theymay not understand how to perform.
Subjects / KeywordsH51, I18, 012; Health; Democratic Republic of Congo; Africa
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