Abstract (EN)

It is now a commonplace to say that public structures are “facing bankruptcy.” This article describes the political consequences of extending to public structures and services a type of rationale and a mode of operation that has until recently been reserved for organizations governed by private law: survival through economic performance and the threat of bankruptcy. Far from being mere rhetoric, the rule of financial selection embodies legal and economic mechanisms that introduce competition within public services and strengthen some of them while weakening others. Turning on the semantic and technical ambiguity of bankruptcy, government through fallibility introduces the fear of extinction to those managing public services with the aim of encouraging reforms, while creating a situation where the precariousness of their resources contributes to making their disappearance a real possibility. By focusing on the substance, structures, and interplay among actors that comprise this regime of fallibility, this article explores the profound transformation of the public sector as it is exposed to the question of its profitability and its liquidation.