Majority Judgment vs Majority Rule
Balinski, Michel; Laraki, Rida (2016), Majority Judgment vs Majority Rule, Social Choice and Welfare, 54, 2-3, p. 429–461. 10.1007/s00355-019-01200-x
TypeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
Journal nameSocial Choice and Welfare
MetadataShow full item record
Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique [CREST]
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Abstract (EN)The validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates—and so also of Condorcet consistency—is challenged. Axioms based on evaluating candidates—paralleling those of K. O. May characterizing majority rule for two candidates based on comparing candidates—lead to another method, majority judgment, that is unique in agreeing with the majority rule on pairs of “polarized” candidates. It is a practical method that accommodates any number of candidates, avoids both the Condorcet and Arrow paradoxes, and best resists strategic manipulation.
Subjects / Keywordsmeasuring; ranking; electing; majority rule; Condorcet consis-tency; tyranny of majority; intensity problem; majority-gauge; strategy-proofness; polarization
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