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hal.structure.identifierLaboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
dc.contributor.authorLang, Jérôme
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dc.contributor.authorMarkakis, Vangelis
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dc.contributor.authorMaudet, Nicolas
HAL ID: 4473
ORCID: 0000-0002-4232-069X
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dc.contributor.authorObraztsova, Svetlana
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dc.contributor.authorPolukarov, Maria
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dc.contributor.authorRabinovich, Zinovi
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-12T14:01:19Z
dc.date.available2020-05-12T14:01:19Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/20723
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectAlgorithmic Game-Theoryen
dc.subjectComputational Social Choiceen
dc.subjectVotingen
dc.subjectStrategic Candidacyen
dc.subject.ddc003en
dc.titleStategic Candidacy with Keen Candidatesen
dc.typeCommunication / Conférence
dc.description.abstractenIn strategic candidacy games, both voters and candidates have preferences over the set of candidates, and candidates make strategic decisions about whether to run an electoral campaign or withdraw from the election, in order to manipulate the outcome according to their preferences. In this work, we extend the standard model of strategic candidacy games to scenarios where candidates may find it harmful for their reputation to withdraw from the election and would only do so if their withdrawal changes the election outcome for the better; otherwise, they would be keen to run the campaign. We study the existence and the quality of Nash equilibria in the resulting class of games, both analytically and empirically, and compare them with the Nash equilibria of the standard model. Our results demonstrate that while in the worst case there may be none or multiple, bad quality equilibria, on average, these games have a unique, optimal equilibrium state.en
dc.relation.ispartoftitle18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems (AAMAS 2019)en
dc.relation.ispartofeditorAgmon, Noa
dc.relation.ispartofeditorTaylor, Matthew E.
dc.relation.ispartofeditorElkind, Edith
dc.relation.ispartofeditorVeloso, Manuela
dc.relation.ispartofpublnameIFAAMASen
dc.subject.ddclabelRecherche opérationnelleen
dc.relation.ispartofisbn978-1-4503-6309-9en
dc.relation.conftitleAAMAS 2019en
dc.relation.confdate2019-05
dc.relation.confcityMontrealen
dc.relation.confcountryCanadaen
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen
dc.description.ssrncandidatenonen
dc.description.halcandidatenonen
dc.description.readershiprechercheen
dc.description.audienceInternationalen
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewednonen
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewednonen
dc.date.updated2020-05-12T13:54:39Z
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