Portioning Using Ordinal Preferences: Fairness and Efficiency
Airiau, Stéphane; Aziz, Haris; Caragiannis, Ioannis; Lang, Jérôme; Peters, Dominik; Kruger, Justin (2019), Portioning Using Ordinal Preferences: Fairness and Efficiency, in Sarit Kraus, Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019, IJCAI, p. 11-17. 10.24963/ijcai.2019/2
TypeCommunication / Conférence
Conference title28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2019)
Book titleProceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019
Book authorSarit Kraus
MetadataShow full item record
Abstract (EN)A public divisible resource is to be divided among projects. We study rules that decide on a distribution of the budget when voters have ordinal preference rankings over projects. Examples of such portioning problems are participatory budgeting, time shares, and parliament elections. We introduce a family of rules for portioning, inspired by positional scoring rules. Rules in this family are given by a scoring vector (such as plurality or Borda) associating a positive value with each rank in a vote, and an aggregation function such as leximin or the Nash product. Our family contains well-studied rules, but most are new. We discuss computational and normative properties of our rules. We focus on fairness, and introduce the SD-core, a group fairness notion. Our Nash rules are in the SD-core, and the leximin rules satisfy individual fairness properties. Both are Pareto-efficient.
Subjects / KeywordsAgent-based and Multi-agent Systems; Cooperative Games; Computational Social Choice
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Aziz, Haris; Brill, Markus; Fischer, Felix; Harrenstein, Paul; Lang, Jérôme; Seedig, Hans Georg (2015) Article accepté pour publication ou publié