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Information sharing is not always the right option when it comes to CPR extraction management: experimental finding

Dubois, Dimitri; Farolfi, Stefano; Nguyen-Van, Phu; Rouchier, Juliette (2018), Information sharing is not always the right option when it comes to CPR extraction management: experimental finding. https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/20917

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WP 2018-11.pdf (828.7Kb)
Type
Document de travail / Working paper
Date
2018
Series title
Preprint Lamsade
Published in
Paris
Metadata
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Author(s)
Dubois, Dimitri cc
Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier [CEE-M]
Farolfi, Stefano
Gestion de l'Eau, Acteurs, Usages [UMR G-EAU]
Nguyen-Van, Phu cc
Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée [BETA]
Rouchier, Juliette cc
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Abstract (EN)
We experimentally investigate the impact of information sharing in a common pool resource game. More precisely, we test whether the voluntary disclosure of the decision by a player has a positive impact on the extraction level exhibited by the group compared to the level observed when decisions are compulsory disclosed. We design an experiment composed by three treatments: a mandatory disclosure treatment and two treatments where players are free to choose whether or not to disclose their decisions. The latter differ by the degree of freedom given to players. In the treatment « Voluntary Free Disclosure » players are also free to choose the extraction level that is displayed, while in the treatment « Voluntary Binary Disclosure » if the player discloses h(is)er decision the value displayed is the effective extraction level. We observe that the voluntary disclosure has a positive effect in the social dilemma, measured by lower average extraction levels. However the disclosure mechanism should not allow to self-declare extraction: here it reveals a large tendency to lie leading to an increase in extraction.
Subjects / Keywords
Information sharing

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