Analysis of Approval Voting in Poisson Games
Durand, François; Macé, Antonin; Nunez, Matias (2019), Analysis of Approval Voting in Poisson Games, in Anna Karlin, the 2019 ACM Conference, ACM - Association for Computing Machinery : New York, NY, p. 317-320. 10.1145/3328526.3329643
TypeCommunication / Conférence
External document linkhttps://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02293130
Conference titleEC '19: Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
Conference cityNew York, NY
Conference countryUNITED STATES
Book titlethe 2019 ACM Conference
Book authorAnna Karlin
MetadataShow full item record
Abstract (EN)We analyze Approval Voting in Poisson games endowing voters with private values over three candidates. We first show that any stable equilibrium is discriminatory: one candidate is commonly regarded as out of contention. We fully characterize stable equilibria and divide them into two classes. In direct equilibria, best responses depend only on ordinal preferences. In indirect equilibria, preference intensities matter. Counterintuitively, any stable equilibrium violates the ordering conditions, a set of belief restrictions used to derive early results in the literature. We finally use Monte-Carlo simulations to estimate the prevalence of the different sorts of equilibria and their likelihood to elect a Condorcet winner.
Subjects / KeywordsAnalysis of Approval Voting in Poisson Games; Applied computing; Law, social and behavioral sciences; Economics
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