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dc.contributor.authorDurand, François
HAL ID: 181195
dc.contributor.authorMacé, Antonin
HAL ID: 17445
ORCID: 0000-0002-3076-9633
dc.contributor.authorNunez, Matias
dc.date.accessioned2020-09-29T10:39:22Z
dc.date.available2020-09-29T10:39:22Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/21001
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectAnalysis of Approval Voting in Poisson Games
dc.subjectApplied computing
dc.subjectLaw, social and behavioral sciences
dc.subjectEconomics
dc.subject.ddc519en
dc.titleAnalysis of Approval Voting in Poisson Games
dc.typeCommunication / Conférence
dc.description.abstractenWe analyze Approval Voting in Poisson games endowing voters with private values over three candidates. We first show that any stable equilibrium is discriminatory: one candidate is commonly regarded as out of contention. We fully characterize stable equilibria and divide them into two classes. In direct equilibria, best responses depend only on ordinal preferences. In indirect equilibria, preference intensities matter. Counterintuitively, any stable equilibrium violates the ordering conditions, a set of belief restrictions used to derive early results in the literature. We finally use Monte-Carlo simulations to estimate the prevalence of the different sorts of equilibria and their likelihood to elect a Condorcet winner.
dc.identifier.citationpages317-320
dc.relation.ispartoftitlethe 2019 ACM Conference
dc.relation.ispartofeditorAnna Karlin
dc.relation.ispartofpublnameACM - Association for Computing Machinery
dc.relation.ispartofpublcityNew York, NY
dc.identifier.urlsitehttps://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02293130
dc.subject.ddclabelProbabilités et mathématiques appliquéesen
dc.relation.ispartofisbn978-1-4503-6792-9
dc.relation.conftitleEC '19: Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
dc.relation.confdate2019
dc.relation.confcityNew York, NY
dc.relation.confcountryUNITED STATES
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen
dc.identifier.doi10.1145/3328526.3329643
dc.description.ssrncandidatenon
dc.description.halcandidatenon
dc.description.readershiprecherche
dc.description.audienceInternational
dc.date.updated2020-10-19T13:34:46Z


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