
Limit Equilibrium Payoffs in Stochastic Games
Renault, Jérôme; Ziliotto, Bruno (2020), Limit Equilibrium Payoffs in Stochastic Games, Mathematics of Operations Research, 45, 3, p. 797-1192. 10.1287/moor.2019.1015
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Article accepté pour publication ou publiéDate
2020Journal name
Mathematics of Operations ResearchVolume
45Number
3Publisher
INFORMS
Pages
797-1192
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Show full item recordAuthor(s)
Renault, JérômeGroupe de recherche en économie mathématique et quantitative [GREMAQ]
Ziliotto, Bruno
CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision [CEREMADE]
Abstract (EN)
We consider 2-player stochastic games with perfectly observed actions, and study the limit, as the discount factor goes to one, of the equilibrium payoffs set. In the usual setup where current states are observed by the players, we show that the set of stationary equilibrium payoffs always converges, and provide a simple example where the set of equilibrium payoffs has no limit. We then introduce the more general model of hidden stochastic game, where the players publicly receive imperfect signals over current states. In this setup we present an example where not only the limit set of equilibrium payoffs does not exist, but there is no converging selection of equilibrium payoffs. This second example is robust in many aspects, in particular to perturbations of the payoffs and to the introduction of correlation or communication devices.Subjects / Keywords
equilibrium payoffs; stochastic gamesRelated items
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