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dc.contributor.authorDubois, D.
HAL ID: 176351
dc.contributor.authorFarolfi, S.
dc.contributor.authorNguyen-Van, P.
dc.contributor.authorRouchier, Juliette
HAL ID: 179063
ORCID: 0000-0002-4022-6720
dc.date.accessioned2020-11-06T13:52:06Z
dc.date.available2020-11-06T13:52:06Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifier.issn1932-6203
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/21193
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectCommon-Pool Resource
dc.subjectBehavioral Environmental Economics
dc.subjectExperimental Economics
dc.subjectVoluntary Information Sharing
dc.subject.ddc004en
dc.titleContrasting effects of information sharing on common-pool resource extraction behavior: experimental findings
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenThis paper experimentally investigates the impact of different information sharing mechanisms in a common-pool resource game, with a view to finding a mechanism that is both efficient and inexpensive for the managing agency. More precisely, we compare the observed extraction levels produced as a result of three mechanisms: a mandatory information sharing mechanism and two voluntary information sharing mechanisms that differ in the degree of freedom given to the players. Our main result is that a voluntary information sharing mechanism could help in reaching a lower average extraction level than that observed with the mandatory mechanism.
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnamePLoS ONE
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol15
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue10
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2020
dc.relation.isversionofdoi10.1371/journal.pone.0240212
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherPublic Library of Science
dc.subject.ddclabelInformatique généraleen
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen
dc.relation.forthcomingprintnonen
dc.description.ssrncandidatenon
dc.description.halcandidatenon
dc.description.readershiprecherche
dc.description.audienceInternational
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewedoui
dc.date.updated2020-12-17T09:05:06Z


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