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Orders of criticality in voting games

Dall'Aglio, Marco; Fragnelli, Vito; Moretti, Stefano (2016), Orders of criticality in voting games, Operations Research and Decisions, 26, 2, p. 53-67. 10.5277/ord160204

Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2016
Journal name
Operations Research and Decisions
Volume
26
Number
2
Pages
53-67
Publication identifier
Metadata
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Author(s)
Dall'Aglio, Marco

Fragnelli, Vito

Moretti, Stefano cc
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Abstract (EN)
The authors focus on the problem of investigating the blackmail power of players in simple games, which is the possibility of players of threatening coalitions to cause them loss using arguments that are (apparently) unjustified. To this purpose, the classical notion of the criticality of players has been extended, in order to characterize situations where players may gain more power over the members of a coalition thanks to collusion with other players
Subjects / Keywords
voting game; blackmailing power; semivalue