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An experiment on deception, reputation and trust

dc.contributor.authorEttinger, David
dc.contributor.authorJehiel, P.
dc.date.accessioned2021-01-11T10:49:17Z
dc.date.available2021-01-11T10:49:17Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.issn1573-6938
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/21431
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectC72
dc.subjectD82
dc.subjectanalogy-based sequential equilibrium
dc.subjectABSE
dc.subject.ddc330.1en
dc.subject.classificationjelD.D8.D82en
dc.subject.classificationjelC.C7.C72en
dc.titleAn experiment on deception, reputation and trust
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherUniversity College London;United Kingdom
dc.description.abstractenAn experiment is designed to shed light on how deception works. The experiment involves a twenty period sender/receiver game in which period 5 has more weight than other periods. In each period, the informed sender communicates about the realized state, the receiver then reports a belief about the state before being informed whether the sender lied. Throughout the interaction, a receiver is matched with the same sender who is either malevolent with an objective opposed to the receiver or benevolent always telling the truth. The main findings are: (1) in several variants (differing in the weight of the key period and the share of benevolent senders), the deceptive tactic in which malevolent senders tell the truth up to the key period and then lie at the key period is used roughly 25% of the time, (2) the deceptive tactic brings higher expected payoff than other observed strategies, and (3) a majority of receivers do not show cautiousness at the key period when no lie was made before. These observations do not match the predictions of the Sequential Equilibrium and can be organized using the analogy-based sequential equilibrium (ABSE) in which three quarters of subjects reason coarsely.
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameExperimental Economics
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol24
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2021
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages821-853
dc.relation.isversionofdoi10.1007/s10683-020-09681-9
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherSpringer
dc.subject.ddclabelThéorie économiqueen
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen
dc.relation.forthcomingprintnonen
dc.description.ssrncandidatenon
dc.description.halcandidateoui
dc.description.readershiprecherche
dc.description.audienceInternational
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewedoui
dc.date.updated2021-12-15T12:26:35Z
hal.identifierhal-03105728*
hal.version1*


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