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Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval: the single crossing case

Sémirat, Stéphan; Forges, Françoise (2021), Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval: the single crossing case. https://basepub.dauphine.psl.eu/handle/123456789/22142

Type
Document de travail / Working paper
External document link
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03231673
Date
2021
Series title
working paper GAEL
Series number
03/2021
Pages
36
Metadata
Show full item record
Author(s)
Sémirat, Stéphan
Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble [GAEL]
Forges, Françoise
Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine [LEDa]
Abstract (EN)
We consider a sender-receiver game, in which the sender has finitely many types and the receiver’s decision is a real number. We assume that utility functions are concave, single-peaked and single-crossing. After the cheap talk phase, the receiver makes a decision, which requires the sender’s approval to be implemented. Otherwise, the sender “exits”. At a perfect Bayesian equilibrium without exit, the receiver must maximize his expected utility subject to the participation constraints of all positive probability types.This necessary condition may not hold at the receiver’s prior belief, so that a non-revealing equilibrium may fail to exist. Similarly, a fully revealing equilibrium may not exist either due to the sender’s incentive compatibility conditions. We propose a constructive algorithm that always achieves a perfect Bayesian equilibrium without exit.
Subjects / Keywords
Approval; cheap talk; sender-receiver game; participation constraints; single-crossing; C72, D82
JEL
C72 - Noncooperative Games
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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