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Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval: the single crossing case

hal.structure.identifierLaboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble [GAEL]
dc.contributor.authorSémirat, Stéphan
hal.structure.identifierLaboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine [LEDa]
dc.contributor.authorForges, Françoise
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-02T09:45:25Z
dc.date.available2021-11-02T09:45:25Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.psl.eu/handle/123456789/22142
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectApproval
dc.subjectcheap talk
dc.subjectsender-receiver game
dc.subjectparticipation constraints
dc.subjectsingle-crossing
dc.subjectC72, D82
dc.subject.ddcThéorie économiqueen
dc.subject.classificationjelC72en
dc.subject.classificationjelD82en
dc.titleStrategic information transmission with sender’s approval: the single crossing case
dc.typeDocument de travail / Working paper
dc.description.abstractenWe consider a sender-receiver game, in which the sender has finitely many types and the receiver’s decision is a real number. We assume that utility functions are concave, single-peaked and single-crossing. After the cheap talk phase, the receiver makes a decision, which requires the sender’s approval to be implemented. Otherwise, the sender “exits”. At a perfect Bayesian equilibrium without exit, the receiver must maximize his expected utility subject to the participation constraints of all positive probability types.This necessary condition may not hold at the receiver’s prior belief, so that a non-revealing equilibrium may fail to exist. Similarly, a fully revealing equilibrium may not exist either due to the sender’s incentive compatibility conditions. We propose a constructive algorithm that always achieves a perfect Bayesian equilibrium without exit.
dc.identifier.citationpages36
dc.relation.ispartofseriestitleworking paper GAEL
dc.relation.ispartofseriesnumber03/2021
dc.identifier.urlsitehttps://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03231673
dc.subject.ddclabel330.1en
dc.description.ssrncandidatenon
dc.description.halcandidatenon
dc.description.readershiprecherche
dc.description.audienceInternational
dc.date.updated2022-01-20T08:28:35Z
dc.subject.classificationjelHALC.C7.C72en
dc.subject.classificationjelHALD.D8.D82en
hal.author.functionaut
hal.author.functionaut


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