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Opportunism and unilateral commitment: The moderating effect of relational capital

Vidot-Delerue, Hélène (2006), Opportunism and unilateral commitment: The moderating effect of relational capital, Management Decision, 44, 6, p. 737-751. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/00251740610673305

Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2006
Nom de la revue
Management Decision
Volume
44
Numéro
6
Éditeur
Emerald Group Publishing Ltd
Pages
737-751
Identifiant publication
http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/00251740610673305
Métadonnées
Afficher la notice complète
Auteur(s)
Vidot-Delerue, Hélène
Résumé (EN)
Purpose – This paper focuses on the decision by firms to commit and to invest unilaterally. It is concerned with the intriguing question as to whether unilateral commitments are mechanisms that help a firm manage risks in alliance relationships in a proactive manner. Design/methodology/approach – The hypotheses are tested with survey data on 344 alliance relationships of European biotechnology small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Findings – In this paper it is shown that unilateral commitments have a positive effect on perceived opportunistic behavior. However, the evidence suggests that, by creating a basis for exchange, relational capital moderates the relationship between unilateral commitments and the perception of opportunistic behavior. Research limitations/implications – This research adopts a static perspective. It is known that alliances evolve, and develop. Consequently, future research could extend and modify this study along this dimension and analyze the evolution of unilateral commitments through longitudinal research. Practical implications – From a managerial point-of-view, this paper shows that motivation for commitments is different and their effects on risk perception can be contradictory according to the level of relational capital in the inter-organizational relationship. Originality/value – This paper is one of the few empirical studies that explored the concept of unilateral commitments and provided empirical evidence to highlight the significance of some managerial practices such as building trust.
Mots-clés
Strategic Alliances; Biotechnology
JEL
D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
M21 - Business Economics

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