Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorVidot-Delerue, Hélène
dc.subjectStrategic Alliancesen
dc.titleOpportunism and unilateral commitment: The moderating effect of relational capitalen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenPurpose – This paper focuses on the decision by firms to commit and to invest unilaterally. It is concerned with the intriguing question as to whether unilateral commitments are mechanisms that help a firm manage risks in alliance relationships in a proactive manner. Design/methodology/approach – The hypotheses are tested with survey data on 344 alliance relationships of European biotechnology small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Findings – In this paper it is shown that unilateral commitments have a positive effect on perceived opportunistic behavior. However, the evidence suggests that, by creating a basis for exchange, relational capital moderates the relationship between unilateral commitments and the perception of opportunistic behavior. Research limitations/implications – This research adopts a static perspective. It is known that alliances evolve, and develop. Consequently, future research could extend and modify this study along this dimension and analyze the evolution of unilateral commitments through longitudinal research. Practical implications – From a managerial point-of-view, this paper shows that motivation for commitments is different and their effects on risk perception can be contradictory according to the level of relational capital in the inter-organizational relationship. Originality/value – This paper is one of the few empirical studies that explored the concept of unilateral commitments and provided empirical evidence to highlight the significance of some managerial practices such as building trust.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameManagement Decision
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherEmerald Group Publishing Ltden
dc.subject.ddclabelDirection d'entrepriseen

Files in this item


There are no files associated with this item.

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record