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hal.structure.identifierSchool of Mathematical Sciences [Tel Aviv]
dc.contributor.authorAshkenazi-Golan, Galit
hal.structure.identifierAix-Marseille Sciences Economiques [AMSE]
dc.contributor.authorTsodikovich, Yevgeny
hal.structure.identifierCEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision [CEREMADE]
dc.contributor.authorViossat, Yannick
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-24T15:39:00Z
dc.date.available2021-11-24T15:39:00Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.psl.eu/handle/123456789/22239
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectauctionsen
dc.subjectmultistage auctionsen
dc.subjectBAFOen
dc.subjectinformation utilizationen
dc.subject.ddc332en
dc.subject.classificationjelD82en
dc.subject.classificationjelD44en
dc.titleI Want to Tell You?Maximizing Revenue in First-Price Two-Stage Auctionsen
dc.typeDocument de travail / Working paper
dc.description.abstractenA common practice in many auctions is to offer bidders an opportunity to improve their bids, known as a Best and Final Offer (BAFO) stage. This final bid can depend on new information provided about either the asset or the competitors. This paper examines the effects of new information regarding competitors, seeking to determine what information the auctioneer should provide assuming the set of allowable bids is discrete. The rational strategy profile that maximizes the revenue of the auctioneer is the one where each bidder makes the highest possible bid that is lower than his valuation of the item. This strategy profile is an equilibrium for a large enough number of bidders, regardless of the information released. We compare the number of bidders needed for this profile to be an equilibrium under different information settings. We find that it becomes an equilibrium with fewer bidders when no additional information is made available to the bidders compared to when information regarding the competition is available. As a result, from the auctioneer's revenue perspective, when the number of bidders is unknown, there are some advantages to not revealing information between the stages of the auction.en
dc.identifier.citationpages26en
dc.relation.ispartofseriestitleCahier de recherche du CEREMADEen
dc.identifier.urlsitehttps://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03078811en
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie financièreen
dc.identifier.citationdate2020
dc.description.ssrncandidatenon
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dc.description.readershiprechercheen
dc.description.audienceInternationalen
dc.date.updated2021-11-24T15:26:08Z
dc.subject.classificationjelHALD - Microeconomics::D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design::D44 - Auctionsen
dc.subject.classificationjelHALD - Microeconomics::D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty::D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Designen
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