On Sustainable Equilibria
Govindan, Srihari; Laraki, Rida; Pahl, Lucas (2020), On Sustainable Equilibria, EC '20: Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, ACM - Association for Computing Machinery : New York, NY, p. 767–768. 10.1145/3391403.3399514
TypeCommunication / Conférence
Conference titleEC '20: Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
Conference cityVirtual Event
Book titleEC '20: Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
MetadataShow full item record
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Abstract (EN)Following the ideas laid out in Myerson (1996), Hofbauer (2000) defined an equilibrium of a game as sustainable if it can be made the unique equilibrium of a game obtained by deleting a subset of the strategies that are inferior replies to it, and then adding others. Hofbauer also formalized Myerson's conjecture about the relationship between the sustainability of an equilibrium and its index: for a generic class of games, an equilibrium is sustainable iff its index is +1. Von Schemde and von Stengel (2008) proved this conjecture for bimatrix games. This paper shows that the conjecture is true for all finite games. More precisely, we prove that an isolated equilibrium of a given game has index +1 if and only if it can be made unique in a larger game obtained by adding finitely many inferior reply strategies.
Subjects / KeywordsSustainable Equilibria
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