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On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules

Nunez, Matias; Sanver, Remzi (2018), On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules, Social Choice and Welfare, 56, p. 421–441. 10.1007/s00355-020-01293-9

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Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2018
Journal name
Social Choice and Welfare
Volume
56
Publisher
Springer
Pages
421–441
Publication identifier
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Author(s)
Nunez, Matias
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Sanver, Remzi
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Abstract (EN)
Abreu and Sen (J Econ Theory 50(2):285–299, 1990) provide a necessary condition, called Condition α, which is almost sufficient for a social choice rule to be implementable via subgame perfect equilibria. Yet, it is not straightforward to check the satisfaction of Condition α. We contribute in this direction by establishing a nuanced picture over the subgame perfect implementability of compromise rules, as a function of the compromise threshold. This contrasts with scoring rules that all fail to be subgame perfect implementable and with several Condorcet rules which are subgame perfect implementable.
Subjects / Keywords
Voting rules