Merger Remedies and Industry Restructuring: A Case for Affirmative Action
Villeneuve, Bertrand; Yanhua Zhang, Vanessa (2011), Merger Remedies and Industry Restructuring: A Case for Affirmative Action. https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/2271
TypeDocument de travail / Working paper
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Abstract (EN)We analyze the trade-off faced by competition authorities envisaging a one-shot structural reform in a capitalistic industry. A structure is (1) a sharing of productive capital at some time and (2) a sharing of sites or any other non-reproducible assets. The latter represent opportunities. These two distinct dimensions of policy illustrate the importance of a dynamic theory in which ﬁrms may differ in several respects. Though equalization of endowments and rights is theoretically optimal, realistic constraints force competition authorities to adopt second-best solutions. Affirmative action here appears to explain why helping the disadvantaged contributes maximally to social surplus.
Subjects / KeywordsRegulatory consistency; Competition policy; Differential games; Assymetric duopoly; Capacity Accumulation; Cournot competition
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