Application and Award Responses to Stricter Screening in Disability Insurance
Godard, Mathilde; Koning, Pierre; Lindeboom, Martin (2022), Application and Award Responses to Stricter Screening in Disability Insurance, The Journal of Human Resources, 57, 3. 10.3368/jhr.1120-11323R1
TypeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
Journal nameThe Journal of Human Resources
University of Wisconsin Press
MetadataShow full item record
Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique [CREST]
Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne [GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne]
Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion des Organisations de Santé [Legos]
Abstract (EN)We examine the targeting effects of stricter screening in the Dutch Disability Insurance (DI) program induced by a nationwide reform. The drastic “Gatekeeper Protocol” increased application costs and revealed more information about individuals’ ability to work. Discontinuity-in-Time regressions on administrative data show substantial declines in DI application rates (40% in one year) following the reform, particularly among difficult-to-verify impairments and less severe health disorders. Individuals that were deterred from applying had worse health and worked less than never-applicants. Changes in average health conditions of awardees were almost fully driven by selfscreening and work resumption during the DI sick-pay period.
Subjects / KeywordsDisability Insurance; Screening; Applications; Awards; Targeting
Showing items related by title and author.
Godard, Mathilde; Koning, Pierre; Lindeboom, Martin (2020-04) Document de travail / Working paper
Garrouste, Clémentine; Godard, Mathilde (2016) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Godard, Mathilde; Garrouste, Clémentine (2015) Document de travail / Working paper