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dc.contributor.authorScarlatti, Sergio
dc.contributor.authorScarsini, Marco
dc.contributor.authorRenault, Jérôme
HAL ID: 21086
dc.date.accessioned2009-10-27T14:40:57Z
dc.date.available2009-10-27T14:40:57Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/2347
dc.descriptionCe document est également paru dans la série des Cahiers de la Chaire "Les particuliers face aux risques", n° 2007/4
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectRepeated Gamesen
dc.subjectImperfect Monitoringen
dc.subjectPublic Equilibriaen
dc.subjectPrivate Equilibriaen
dc.subjectDiscount Factoren
dc.subjectPareto-efficiencyen
dc.subject.ddc332en
dc.subject.classificationjelC72en
dc.titleDiscounted and Finitely Repeated Minority Games with Public Signalsen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenWe consider a repeated game where at each stage players simultaneously choose one of two rooms. The players who choose the less crowded room are rewarded with one euro. The players in the same room do not recognize each other, and between the stages only the current majority room is publicly announced, hence the game has imperfect public monitoring. An undiscounted version of this game was considered by Renault et al. (2005), who proved a folk theorem. Here we consider a discounted version and a finitely repeated version of the game, and we strengthen our previous result by showing that the set of equilibrium payoffs Hausdorff-converges to the feasible set as either the discount factor goes to one or the number of repetition goes to infinity. We show that the set of public equilibria for this game is strictly smaller than the set of private equilibria.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameMathematical Social Sciences
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol56
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue1
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2008-07
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages44-74
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.12.004
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherElsevier
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie financièreen


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