Game Theoretical Analysis of Cross-Chain Swaps
Belotti, Marianna; Moretti, Stefano; Gradinariu Potop-Butucaru, Maria; Secci, Stefano (2020), Game Theoretical Analysis of Cross-Chain Swaps, 2020 IEEE 40th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS), IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers : Piscataway, NJ, p. 485-495. 10.1109/ICDCS47774.2020.00060
Type
Communication / ConférenceExternal document link
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02414356Date
2020Conference title
2020 IEEE 40th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS)Conference date
2020-11Conference city
SingaporeConference country
SingaporeBook title
2020 IEEE 40th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS)Publisher
IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
Published in
Piscataway, NJ
ISBN
978-1-7281-7003-9
Number of pages
1430Pages
485-495
Publication identifier
Metadata
Show full item recordAuthor(s)
Belotti, Marianna
Centre d'études et de recherche en informatique et communications [CEDRIC]
Moretti, Stefano

Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Gradinariu Potop-Butucaru, Maria
LIP6
Secci, Stefano

Centre d'études et de recherche en informatique et communications [CEDRIC]
Abstract (EN)
In this paper we address the distributed cross-chain swap problem in the blockchain context where multiple agents exchange assets across multiple blockchain systems (e.g. trading Bitcoins for Litecoins or Ethers). We present a mathematical framework allowing to characterize blockchain swap protocols as the combination of a publishing and a commitment phase, where contracts are respectively published and then committed. We characterize the equilibria of existing cross-chain swap protocols (i.e., blockchain swap protocols exchanging assets among different blockchains). More precisely, we prove that following a swap protocol characterized by concurrent publishing of exchange contracts and snap (immediate) assets transfers is a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we prove that for protocols with a sequential publishing and commitment of the assets transfers, following the prescribed protocol is a sub-game perfect equilibrium.Subjects / Keywords
Escrow; Interoperability; Atomic swap; Blockchain technologyRelated items
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