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Project games

Bilò, Vittorio; Gourvès, Laurent; Monnot, Jérôme (2023), Project games, Theoretical Computer Science, 940, Part A, p. 97-111. 10.1016/j.tcs.2022.10.043

Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2023
Journal name
Theoretical Computer Science
Volume
940
Number
Part A
Publisher
Elsevier
Pages
97-111
Publication identifier
Metadata
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Author(s)
Bilò, Vittorio cc
Dipartimento di Matematica Ennio De Giorgi
Gourvès, Laurent cc
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Monnot, Jérôme cc
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Abstract (EN)
We consider a strategic game, called project game, where each agent has to choose a project among her own list of available projects. The model includes positive weights expressing the capacity of a given agent to contribute to a given project. The realization of a project produces some reward that has to be allocated to the agents. The reward of a realized project is fully allocated to its contributors according to a simple proportional rule. Existence and computational complexity of pure Nash equilibria is addressed and their efficiency is investigated according to both the utilitarian and the egalitarian social function.
Subjects / Keywords
Pure Nash equilibria; Price of anarchy; Price of stability