Abstract (EN)

Procedures designed to select alternatives on the basis of the results of pairwise contests between them have received much attention in literature. The particular case of tournaments has been studied in depth. More recently weak tournaments and valued generalizations thereof have been investigated.The purpose of this paper is to investigate to what extent these choice procedures may be meaningfully used to define ranking procedures via their repeated use, i.e. when the equivalence classes of the ranking are determined by successive applications of the choice procedure. This is what we call ldquoranking by choosingrdquo. As could be expected, such ranking procedures raise monotonicity problems. We analyze these problems and show that it is nevertheless possible to isolate a large class of well-behaved choice procedures for which failures of monotonicity are not overly serious. The hope of finding really attractive ranking by choosing procedures is however shown to be limited. Our results are illustrated on the case of tournaments.