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Shareholder agreements and firm value: Evidence from French listed firms

Belot, François (2008), Shareholder agreements and firm value: Evidence from French listed firms, AFFI (Association Française de Finance), 2008-12, Paris, France

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Type
Communication / Conférence
Date
2008
Conference title
AFFI (Association Française de Finance)
Conference date
2008-12
Conference city
Paris
Conference country
France
Pages
53
Metadata
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Author(s)
Belot, François
Abstract (EN)
In listed companies, some shareholders can be signatories to agreements that govern their relations. This paper investigates the effects of such agreements on the valuation of firms. I use a sample of French firms that is well suited for my analysis insofar as French law requires the disclosure of the shareholder agreements’ clauses. In line with previous literature, a negative relationship between firm value and the dispersion of voting rights across major shareholders is observed. However, the existence of a shareholder agreement tends to offset this negative effect. This countervailing effect is more pronounced when a “concerted action” provision is in force and/or the contracting shareholders are of the same type. Shareholder agreements thus appear as efficient coordination mechanisms rather than expropriation mechanisms.
Subjects / Keywords
corporate governance; large shareholders; Shareholder agreements
JEL
G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
G32 - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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