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How hard is it to Control Sequential Elections via the Agenda?

Conitzer, Vincent; Lang, Jérôme; Xia, Lirong (2009), How hard is it to Control Sequential Elections via the Agenda?, IJCAI-09, 21st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI Press / IJCAI : Palo Alto (USA), p. 103-108

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IJCAI09-028.pdf (532.8Kb)
Type
Communication / Conférence
Date
2009
Conference country
UNITED STATES
Book title
IJCAI-09, 21st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Publisher
AAAI Press / IJCAI
Published in
Palo Alto (USA)
Pages
103-108
Metadata
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Author(s)
Conitzer, Vincent
Lang, Jérôme
Xia, Lirong
Abstract (EN)
Voting on multiple related issues is an importantand difficult problem. The key difficulty is that thenumber of alternatives is exponential in the numberof issues, and hence it is infeasible for the agentsto rank all the alternatives. A simple approach is tovote on the issues one at a time, in sequence; however, a drawback is that the outcome may dependon the order in which the issues are voted upon anddecided, which gives the chairperson some controlover the outcome of the election because she canstrategically determine the order. While this is undeniably a negative feature of sequential voting, inthis paper we temper this judgment by showing thatthe chairperson’s control problem is, in most cases,computationally hard.
Subjects / Keywords
Voting
JEL
C60 - General
D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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