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dc.contributor.authorJouini, Elyès
HAL ID: 6654
dc.contributor.authorNapp, Clotilde
HAL ID: 741006
ORCID: 0000-0002-7008-5949
dc.date.accessioned2010-04-16T08:41:22Z
dc.date.available2010-04-16T08:41:22Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/3980
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectdistorded beliefsen
dc.subjectoptimal beliefsen
dc.subjectstrategic beliefsen
dc.subjectbeliefs formationen
dc.subject.ddc332en
dc.subject.classificationjelD03en
dc.subject.classificationjelG12en
dc.subject.classificationjelD84en
dc.subject.classificationjelD81en
dc.titleOptimal Strategic Beliefsen
dc.typeDocument de travail / Working paper
dc.description.abstractenWe provide a discipline for belief formation through a model of subjective beliefs, in which agents hold incorrect but strategic beliefs. More precisely, we consider beliefs as a strategic variable that agents can choose (consciously or not) in order to maximize their utility at the equilibrium. We find that strategic behaviour leads to belief subjectivity and heterogeneity. Optimism (resp. overconfidence) as well as pessimism (resp. doubt) both emerge as optimal beliefs. Furthermore, we obtain a positive correlation between pessimism (resp. doubt) and risk-tolerance.en
dc.publisher.nameUniversité Paris-Dauphine
dc.publisher.cityParis
dc.identifier.citationpages22en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie financièreen


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