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dc.contributor.authorForges, Françoise
dc.contributor.authorBiran, Omer
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-05T13:38:31Z
dc.date.available2010-05-05T13:38:31Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/4100
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectCoreen
dc.subjectpartition function gameen
dc.subjectCollusionen
dc.subjectAuctionsen
dc.subjectBayesian gameen
dc.subject.ddc519en
dc.subject.classificationjelC71en
dc.subject.classificationjelC72en
dc.subject.classificationjelD44en
dc.titleCore-stable rings in auctions with independent private valuesen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenWe propose a semi-cooperative game theoretic approach to check whether a given coalition is stable in a Bayesian game with independent private values. The ex ante expected utilities of coalitions, at an incentive compatible (noncooperative) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative) partition form game. A coalition is core-stable if the core of a suitable characteristic function, derived from the partition form game, is not empty. As an application, we study collusion in auctions in which the bidders' final utility possibly depends on the winner's identity. We show that such direct externalities offer a possible explanation for cartels'structures (not) observed in practice.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameGames and Economic Behavior
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol73
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue1
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2011
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages52-64
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.01.009
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherElsevier
dc.subject.ddclabelProbabilités et mathématiques appliquéesen


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