Restricted Classes of Utility Functions for Simple Negotiation Schemes: Sufficiency, Necessity and Maximality
Maudet, Nicolas; Endriss, Ulle; Chevaleyre, Yann (2008), Restricted Classes of Utility Functions for Simple Negotiation Schemes: Sufficiency, Necessity and Maximality, in Paschos, Vangelis, Combinatorial Optimization and Theoretical Computer Science: Interfaces and Perspectives: 30th anniversary of the LAMSADE, Wiley : Hoboken NJ, p. 175-202
External document linkhttp://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00116629/en/
Book titleCombinatorial Optimization and Theoretical Computer Science: Interfaces and Perspectives: 30th anniversary of the LAMSADE
Book authorPaschos, Vangelis
Number of pages515
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Abstract (EN)We investigate the properties of an abstract negotiation framework where agents autonomously negotiate over allocations of discrete resources. In this framework, reaching an optimal allocation potentially requires very complex multilateral deals. Therefore, we are interested in identifying classes of utility functions such that any negotiation conducted by means of deals involving only a single resource at at time is bound to converge to an optimal allocation whenever all agents model their preferences using these functions. We show that the class of modular utility functions is not only sufficient (when side-payments are allowed) but also maximal in this sense. A similar result is proven in the context of negotiation without money.
Subjects / KeywordsSimple Negotiation Schemes
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Simple Negotiation Schemes for Agents with Simple Preferences: Sufficiency, Necessity and Maximality Chevaleyre, Yann; Endriss, Ulle; Maudet, Nicolas (2010) Article accepté pour publication ou publié