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dc.contributor.authorChemla, Gilles
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-10T13:54:27Z
dc.date.available2010-05-10T13:54:27Z
dc.date.issued2005-07
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/4134
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectFinances et gouvernance des entreprisesen
dc.subjectStructure du capital et de la propriétéen
dc.subjectMouvements financiersen
dc.subject.ddc332en
dc.subject.classificationjelG11en
dc.subject.classificationjelG35en
dc.subject.classificationjelG34en
dc.titleHold-Up, Stakeholders and Takeover Threatsen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenWe analyze the impact of takeover threats on long term relationships between the target owners and other stakeholders. In the absence of takeovers, stakeholders’ bargaining power increases their incentive to invest but reduces the owners’ incentive to invest. The threat of a takeover that would transfer value from the stakeholders reduces their ex ante investment. However, the stakeholders may appropriate ex post some value created by a takeover. This can prevent some value-enhancing takeovers. We examine extensions to the disciplinary role of takeovers, takeover defence mechanisms, and trade credit, and discuss empirical predictions.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameJournal of financial intermediation
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol14
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue3
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2005-07
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages376-397
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2004.08.004
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherCA. Academic Press
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie financièreen


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