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dc.contributor.authorGourvès, Laurent
dc.contributor.authorMonnot, Jérôme
HAL ID: 178759
ORCID: 0000-0002-7452-6553
dc.date.accessioned2010-06-11T09:42:54Z
dc.date.available2010-06-11T09:42:54Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/4324
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectNash Equilibriumen
dc.subjectMax Cuten
dc.subject.ddc003en
dc.titleOn Strong Equilibria in the Max Cut Gameen
dc.typeCommunication / Conférence
dc.description.abstractenThis paper deals with two games defined upon well known generalizations of max cut. We study the existence of a strong equilibrium which is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium. Bounds on the price of anarchy for Nash equilibria and strong equilibria are also given. In particular, we show that the max cut game always admits a strong equilibrium and the strong price of anarchy is 2/3.en
dc.identifier.citationpages608-615en
dc.relation.ispartofseriestitleLecture Notes in Computer Science
dc.relation.ispartofseriesnumber5929
dc.relation.ispartoftitleProceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofeditorLeonardi, Stefano
dc.relation.ispartofpublnameSpringer-Verlagen
dc.relation.ispartofpublcityBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofdate2009
dc.relation.ispartofpages642en
dc.relation.ispartofurlhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.subject.ddclabelRecherche opérationnelleen
dc.relation.ispartofisbn978-3-642-10840-2en
dc.relation.conftitleWINE 2009, 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economicsen
dc.relation.confdate2009-12
dc.relation.confcityRomeen
dc.relation.confcountryItalieen
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_62


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