
Investor Affiliation, Experience and Venture Capital Financial Contracts
Joly, Vanessa (2010), Investor Affiliation, Experience and Venture Capital Financial Contracts, 2010 FMA Annual Meeting, 2010-10, New York, États-Unis
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Type
Communication / ConférenceDate
2010Titre du colloque
2010 FMA Annual MeetingDate du colloque
2010-10Ville du colloque
New YorkPays du colloque
États-UnisPages
27
Métadonnées
Afficher la notice complèteAuteur(s)
Joly, VanessaRésumé (EN)
This paper explores the relationship between venture capitalists (VCs)’ financial contracts and the characteristics of these VCs. Analyzing VCs' responses to our questionnaire, we find that VCs’ contractual behaviors differ according to affiliation and experience. VCs working for independent investment firms write contracts providing more protection against risks of agency conflicts between investors and entrepreneurs than VCs working for firms affiliated to a bank or “regional” investors. In addition, both independent and non-independent investors implement less protection against these risks when they have longstanding experience in the venture capital business. Finally, we differentiate the impact of affiliation and experience by type of portfolio company.Mots-clés
Agency Conflicts; Venture Capital; Financial Contracting; Experience; AffiliationPublications associées
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Joly, Vanessa (2009-02) Communication / Conférence
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Jouaber, Kaouther; Mehri, Meryem (2012-11) Document de travail / Working paper
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Gazaniol, Alexandre (2012) Document de travail / Working paper
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Cumming, Douglas; Fleming, Grant; Johan, Sofia; Najar, Dorra (2013) Chapitre d'ouvrage
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Chemla, Gilles (2004) Article accepté pour publication ou publié