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Investor Affiliation, Experience and Venture Capital Financial Contracts

dc.contributor.authorJoly, Vanessa
dc.date.accessioned2010-06-25T08:25:06Z
dc.date.available2010-06-25T08:25:06Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/4429
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectAgency Conflictsen
dc.subjectVenture Capitalen
dc.subjectFinancial Contractingen
dc.subjectExperienceen
dc.subjectAffiliationen
dc.subject.ddc332en
dc.subject.classificationjelG24en
dc.subject.classificationjelG32en
dc.titleInvestor Affiliation, Experience and Venture Capital Financial Contractsen
dc.typeCommunication / Conférence
dc.description.abstractenThis paper explores the relationship between venture capitalists (VCs)’ financial contracts and the characteristics of these VCs. Analyzing VCs' responses to our questionnaire, we find that VCs’ contractual behaviors differ according to affiliation and experience. VCs working for independent investment firms write contracts providing more protection against risks of agency conflicts between investors and entrepreneurs than VCs working for firms affiliated to a bank or “regional” investors. In addition, both independent and non-independent investors implement less protection against these risks when they have longstanding experience in the venture capital business. Finally, we differentiate the impact of affiliation and experience by type of portfolio company.en
dc.identifier.citationpages27en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie financièreen
dc.relation.conftitle2010 FMA Annual Meetingen
dc.relation.confdate2010-10
dc.relation.confcityNew York
dc.relation.confcountryÉtats-Unis


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