Smarter Task Assignment or Greater Effort: the  impact of incentives on team performance

Propper, Carol; von Hinke Kessler Scholder, Stephanie; Tominey, Emma; Ratto, Marisa; Burgess, Simon

Propper, Carol; von Hinke Kessler Scholder, Stephanie; Tominey, Emma; Ratto, Marisa; Burgess, Simon (2010), Smarter Task Assignment or Greater Effort: the impact of incentives on team performance, The Economic Journal, 120, 547, p. 968-989. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02331.x

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Type

Article accepté pour publication ou publié

Date

2010

Journal name

The Economic Journal

Volume

120

Number

547

Publisher

Wiley

Pages

968-989

Abstract (EN)

We use an experiment to study the impact of team-based incentives, exploiting rich data from personnel records and management information systems. Using a triple difference design, we show that the incentive scheme had an impact on team performance, even with quite large teams. We examine whether this effect was due to increased effort from workers or strategic task reallocation. We find that the provision of financial incentives did raise individual performance but that managers also disproportionately reallocated efficient workers to the incentivised tasks. We show that this reallocation was the more important contributor to the overall outcome.

Subjects / Keywords

Public Sector; Incentives; Performance; Teams

JEL

J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
J38 - Public Policy