• xmlui.mirage2.page-structure.header.title
    • français
    • English
  • Help
  • Login
  • Language 
    • Français
    • English
View Item 
  •   BIRD Home
  • LEDa (UMR CNRS 8007, UMR IRD 260)
  • LEDa : Publications
  • View Item
  •   BIRD Home
  • LEDa (UMR CNRS 8007, UMR IRD 260)
  • LEDa : Publications
  • View Item
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

Browse

BIRDResearch centres & CollectionsBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesTypeThis CollectionBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesType

My Account

LoginRegister

Statistics

Most Popular ItemsStatistics by CountryMost Popular Authors
Thumbnail

Smarter Task Assignment or Greater Effort: the impact of incentives on team performance

Propper, Carol; von Hinke Kessler Scholder, Stephanie; Tominey, Emma; Ratto, Marisa; Burgess, Simon (2010), Smarter Task Assignment or Greater Effort: the impact of incentives on team performance, The Economic Journal, 120, 547, p. 968-989. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02331.x

View/Open
Ratto 2009-03.pdf (456.7Kb)
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2010
Journal name
The Economic Journal
Volume
120
Number
547
Publisher
Wiley
Pages
968-989
Publication identifier
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02331.x
Metadata
Show full item record
Author(s)
Propper, Carol
von Hinke Kessler Scholder, Stephanie
Tominey, Emma
Ratto, Marisa
Burgess, Simon
Abstract (EN)
We use an experiment to study the impact of team-based incentives, exploiting rich data from personnel records and management information systems. Using a triple difference design, we show that the incentive scheme had an impact on team performance, even with quite large teams. We examine whether this effect was due to increased effort from workers or strategic task reallocation. We find that the provision of financial incentives did raise individual performance but that managers also disproportionately reallocated efficient workers to the incentivised tasks. We show that this reallocation was the more important contributor to the overall outcome.
Subjects / Keywords
Public Sector; Incentives; Performance; Teams
JEL
J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
J38 - Public Policy

Related items

Showing items related by title and author.

  • Thumbnail
    Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from a Government Agency 
    Burgess, Simon; Propper, Carol; Ratto, Marisa; Tominey, Emma (2017) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
  • Thumbnail
    Team Structure and the Effectiveness of Collective Performance Pay 
    Ratto, Marisa; Tominey, Emma; Vergé, Thibaud (2012-07) Document de travail / Working paper
  • Thumbnail
    Relative performance of two simple incentive mechanisms in a public goods experiment 
    Bracht, Juergen; Figuières, Charles; Ratto, Marisa (2008) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
  • Thumbnail
    Implicit and Explicit Incentives to Cooperate in Teams 
    Ratto, Marisa (2011) Communication / Conférence
  • Thumbnail
    Financial Incentives, Efforts, and Performances in the Health Sector: Experimental Evidence from the Democratic Republic of Congo 
    Huillery, Elise; Seban, Juliette (2019) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Dauphine PSL Bibliothèque logo
Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny 75775 Paris Cedex 16
Phone: 01 44 05 40 94
Contact
Dauphine PSL logoEQUIS logoCreative Commons logo