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dc.contributor.authorPropper, Carol
dc.contributor.authorvon Hinke Kessler Scholder, Stephanie
dc.contributor.authorTominey, Emma
dc.contributor.authorRatto, Marisa
dc.contributor.authorBurgess, Simon
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-10T09:12:29Z
dc.date.available2010-09-10T09:12:29Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/4727
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectPublic Sectoren
dc.subjectIncentivesen
dc.subjectPerformanceen
dc.subjectTeamsen
dc.subject.ddc331en
dc.subject.classificationjelJ33en
dc.subject.classificationjelJ38en
dc.titleSmarter Task Assignment or Greater Effort: the impact of incentives on team performanceen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenWe use an experiment to study the impact of team-based incentives, exploiting rich data from personnel records and management information systems. Using a triple difference design, we show that the incentive scheme had an impact on team performance, even with quite large teams. We examine whether this effect was due to increased effort from workers or strategic task reallocation. We find that the provision of financial incentives did raise individual performance but that managers also disproportionately reallocated efficient workers to the incentivised tasks. We show that this reallocation was the more important contributor to the overall outcome.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameThe Economic Journal
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol120
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue547
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2010
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages968-989
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02331.x
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherWiley
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie du travailen


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