Compact preference representation and Boolean games
Bonzon, Elise; Lagasquie-Schiex, Marie-Christine; Lang, Jérôme; Zanuttini, Bruno (2009), Compact preference representation and Boolean games, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 18, 1, p. 1-35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10458-008-9040-2
TypeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
Journal nameAutonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
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Abstract (EN)Game theory is a widely used formal model for studying strategical interactions between agents. Boolean games (Harrenstein, Logic in conflict, PhD thesis, 2004; Harrenstein et al., Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, pp. 287–298, San Francisco Morgan Kaufmann, 2001) yield a compact representation of 2-player zero-sum static games with binary preferences: an agent’s strategy consists of a truth assignment of the propositional variables she controls, and a player’s preferences are expressed by a plain propositional formula. These restrictions (2-player, zero-sum, binary preferences) strongly limit the expressivity of the framework. We first generalize the framework to n-player games which are not necessarily zero-sum. We give simple characterizations of Nash equilibria and dominated strategies, and investigate the computational complexity of the associated problems. Then, we relax the last restriction by coupling Boolean games with a representation, namely, CP-nets.
Subjects / KeywordsPropositional logic; Preference representation; CP-nets; Game theory
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