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dc.contributor.authorBracht, Juergen
dc.contributor.authorFiguières, Charles
dc.contributor.authorRatto, Marisa
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-17T09:32:36Z
dc.date.available2010-09-17T09:32:36Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/4809
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectincentive mechanismsen
dc.subjectvoluntary provisionen
dc.subjectpublic goodsen
dc.subject.ddc336en
dc.subject.classificationjelD62en
dc.subject.classificationjelH42en
dc.titleRelative performance of two simple incentive mechanisms in a public goods experimenten
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenWe compare the performance of two incentive mechanisms in public goods experiments. One mechanism, the Falkinger mechanism, rewards and penalizes agents for deviations from the average contributions to the public good (Falkinger mechanism). The other, the compensation mechanism, allows agents to subsidize the other agents' contributions (compensation mechanism). It is found that both mechanisms lead to an increase in the level of contributions to the public goods. However, the Falkinger mechanism predicts the average level of contributions more reliably than the compensation mechanism.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameJournal of Public Economics
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol92en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue1-2en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2008
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages54-90en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.04.005en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherElsevieren
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie publiqueen


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