Efficient coalitions in Boolean games
Bonzon, Elise; Lagasquie-Schiex, Marie-Christine; Lang, Jérôme (2008), Efficient coalitions in Boolean games, in Van Rooij, Robert, New Perspectives on Games and Interaction, Amsterdam University Press, p. 330
Book titleNew Perspectives on Games and Interaction
Book authorVan Rooij, Robert
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Abstract (EN)Boolean games are a logical setting for representing strategic games in a succinct way, taking advantage of the expressive power and conciseness of propositional logic. A Boolean game consists of a set of players, each of whom controlsa set of propositional variables and has a speciﬁc goal expressed by a propositional formula. We show here that Boolean games are a very simple setting, yetsophisticated enough, for studying coalitions. Due to the fact that players havedichotomous preferences, the following notion emerges naturally: a coalition ina Boolean game is efﬁcient if it guarantees that the goal of each member of thecoalition is satisﬁed. We study the properties of efﬁcient coalitions, and we givea characterization of efﬁcient coalitions.
Subjects / KeywordsBoolean games; strategic games
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