Vote and Aggregation in Combinatorial Domains with Structured Preferences
Lang, Jérôme (2007), Vote and Aggregation in Combinatorial Domains with Structured Preferences, in Veloso, Manuela, IJCAI 2007, International Joint Conferences on Artifical Intelligence - Proceedings, AAAI Press / IJCAI : Palo Alto (USA), p. 1366-1371
TypeCommunication / Conférence
Book titleIJCAI 2007, International Joint Conferences on Artifical Intelligence - Proceedings
Book authorVeloso, Manuela
MetadataShow full item record
Abstract (EN)In many real-world collective decision problems,the set of alternatives is a Cartesian product of ﬁnitevalue domains for each of a given set of variables.The prohibitive size of such domains makes it practically impossible to represent preference relationsexplicitly. Now, AI has been developing languagesfor representing preferences on such domains in asuccinct way, exploiting structural properties suchas conditional preferential independence. Here wereconsider voting and aggregation rules in the casewhere voters’ preferences have a common preferential independence structure, and address the decomposition a voting rule or an aggregation function following a linear order over variables.
Subjects / KeywordsPreference representation; vote; preference relations
Showing items related by title and author.
Lang, Jérôme; Pini, Maria Silvia; Rossi, Francesca; Salvagnin, Domenico; Venable, Kristen Brent; Walsh, Toby (2012) Article accepté pour publication ou publié