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On maximal classes of utility functions for efficient one-to-one negotiation

Chevaleyre, Yann; Endriss, Ulle; Maudet, Nicolas (2005), On maximal classes of utility functions for efficient one-to-one negotiation, in Kaelbling, Leslie Pack; Saffiotti, Alessandro, IJCAI-05, Proceedings of the Nineteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Edinburgh, Scotland, UK, July 30-August 5, 2005., Professional Book Center, p. 941-946

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Type
Communication / Conférence
Date
2005
Conference title
19th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-2005)
Conference date
2005-07
Conference city
Edimbourg
Conference country
Royaume-Uni
Book title
IJCAI-05, Proceedings of the Nineteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Edinburgh, Scotland, UK, July 30-August 5, 2005.
Book author
Kaelbling, Leslie Pack; Saffiotti, Alessandro
Publisher
Professional Book Center
ISBN
0938075934
Pages
941-946
Metadata
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Author(s)
Chevaleyre, Yann
Endriss, Ulle
Maudet, Nicolas cc
Abstract (EN)
We investigate the properties of an abstract negotiation framework where agents autonomously negotiate over allocations of discrete resources. In this framework, reaching an optimal allocation potentially requires very complex multilateral deals. Therefore, we are interested in identifying classes of utility functions such that any negotiation conducted by means of deals involving only a single resource at time is bound to converge to an optimal allocation whenever all agents model their preferences using these functions. We show that the class of modular utility functions is not only sufficient but also maximal in this sense.
Subjects / Keywords
utility functions; allocation of resources; negotiations