Complementarity and Substituability in Multiple-Risk Insurance Markets
Koehl, Pierre-François; Villeneuve, Bertrand (2001), Complementarity and Substituability in Multiple-Risk Insurance Markets, International economic review, 42, 1, p. 245-266. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-2354.00109
TypeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
Journal nameInternational economic review
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Abstract (EN)We study imperfect competition between insurers in a multiple-risk environment. In the absence of asymmetric information, equilibria are efficient, and we determine the degrees of specialization under which the specialized insurers are able or unable to capture the surplus. We show in contrast that under adverse selection, specialization systematically prevents second-best efficiency. Concluding on the role of our notions of strategic complementarity/substituability on the tradeoff between efficiency and fairness of the allocation, we give indications on the desirable structure of the insurance industry.
Subjects / KeywordsRisk; Insurance; Information; Equilibria; Adverse selection; Asymmetric information
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