
Insurance contracts with imprecise probabilities and adverse selection
Jeleva, Meglena; Villeneuve, Bertrand (2004), Insurance contracts with imprecise probabilities and adverse selection, Economic theory, 23, 4, p. 777-794. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-003-0396-x
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Article accepté pour publication ou publiéDate
2004Journal name
Economic theoryVolume
23Number
4Publisher
Springer
Pages
777-794
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Show full item recordAbstract (EN)
This article deals with optimal insurance contracts in the framework of imprecise probabilities and adverse selection. Agents differ not only in the objective risk they face but also in the perception of risk. In monopoly, a range of configurations that VNM preferences preclude appears: a pooling contract may be optimal, incomplete coverage may be offered to high risks, low risks may be better covered.Subjects / Keywords
Imprecise probabilities; Insurance markets; Adverse selectionRelated items
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