Show simple item record

Extensive form correlated equilibrium: definition and computational complexity

dc.contributor.authorVon Stengel, Bernhard
dc.contributor.authorForges, Françoise
dc.date.accessioned2009-06-30T08:10:27Z
dc.date.available2009-06-30T08:10:27Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/535
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectpolymonial-time comptableen
dc.subjectextensive gameen
dc.subjectcorrelated equilibriumen
dc.subject.ddc519en
dc.titleExtensive form correlated equilibrium: definition and computational complexityen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenThis paper defines the extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE) for extensive games with perfect recall. The EFCE concept extends Aumann's strategic-form correlated equilibrium (CE). Before the game starts, a correlation device generates a move for each information set. This move is recommended to the player only when the player reaches the information set. In two-player perfect-recall extensive games without chance moves, the set of EFCE can be described by a polynomial number of consistency and incentive constraints. Assuming P is not equal to NP, this is not possible for the set of CE, or if the game has chance moves.
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameMathematics of Operations Research
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol33en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue4
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2008
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages1002-1022en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.1080.0340en
dc.relation.isversionofdoi
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherINFORMS
dc.subject.ddclabelProbabilités et mathématiques appliquéesen


Files in this item

Thumbnail
Name:
plugin-2006-21.pdf
Size:
165.1Kb
Format:
PDF
View/Open

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record