Mandatory pensions and the intensity of adverse selection in life insurance markets
Villeneuve, Bertrand (2003), Mandatory pensions and the intensity of adverse selection in life insurance markets, The Journal of risk and insurance, 70, 3, p. 527-548. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1539-6975.t01-1-00063
TypeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
Journal nameThe Journal of risk and insurance
MetadataShow full item record
Abstract (EN)This article examines the impact of varying mandatory pensions on saving, life insurance, and annuity markets in an adverse selection economy. Under reasonable restrictions, we find unambiguous effects on market size, participation rates, and equilibrium prices. The degree of adverse selection, whether a market is active or inactive, and social welfare are analyzed.
Subjects / KeywordsAdverse selection; social welfare; Insurance markets
Showing items related by title and author.
The consequences for a monopolistic insurance firm of evaluating risk better than customers : The adverse selection hypothesis reversed Villeneuve, Bertrand (2000) Article accepté pour publication ou publié