Thumbnail - Request a copy

Mandatory pensions and the intensity of adverse selection in life insurance markets

Villeneuve, Bertrand (2003), Mandatory pensions and the intensity of adverse selection in life insurance markets, The Journal of risk and insurance, 70, 3, p. 527-548. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1539-6975.t01-1-00063

Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2003
Journal name
The Journal of risk and insurance
Volume
70
Number
3
Publisher
Wiley
Pages
527-548
Publication identifier
Metadata
Show full item record
Author(s)
Villeneuve, Bertrand cc
Abstract (EN)
This article examines the impact of varying mandatory pensions on saving, life insurance, and annuity markets in an adverse selection economy. Under reasonable restrictions, we find unambiguous effects on market size, participation rates, and equilibrium prices. The degree of adverse selection, whether a market is active or inactive, and social welfare are analyzed.
Subjects / Keywords
Adverse selection; social welfare; Insurance markets
JEL
G22 - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
D80 - General