Mandatory pensions and the intensity of adverse selection in life insurance markets
Villeneuve, Bertrand (2003), Mandatory pensions and the intensity of adverse selection in life insurance markets, The Journal of risk and insurance, 70, 3, p. 527-548. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1539-6975.t01-1-00063
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publiéDate
2003Journal name
The Journal of risk and insuranceVolume
70Number
3Publisher
Wiley
Pages
527-548
Publication identifier
Metadata
Show full item recordAbstract (EN)
This article examines the impact of varying mandatory pensions on saving, life insurance, and annuity markets in an adverse selection economy. Under reasonable restrictions, we find unambiguous effects on market size, participation rates, and equilibrium prices. The degree of adverse selection, whether a market is active or inactive, and social welfare are analyzed.Subjects / Keywords
Adverse selection; social welfare; Insurance marketsRelated items
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