Mandatory pensions and the intensity of adverse selection in life insurance markets

Villeneuve, Bertrand

Villeneuve, Bertrand (2003), Mandatory pensions and the intensity of adverse selection in life insurance markets, The Journal of risk and insurance, 70, 3, p. 527-548. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1539-6975.t01-1-00063

Type

Article accepté pour publication ou publié

Date

2003

Nom de la revue

The Journal of risk and insurance

Volume

Numéro

Éditeur

Wiley

Pages

527-548

Résumé (EN)

This article examines the impact of varying mandatory pensions on saving, life insurance, and annuity markets in an adverse selection economy. Under reasonable restrictions, we find unambiguous effects on market size, participation rates, and equilibrium prices. The degree of adverse selection, whether a market is active or inactive, and social welfare are analyzed.