Mandatory pensions and the intensity of adverse selection in life insurance markets

dc.contributor.author	Villeneuve, Bertrand HAL ID: 745441 ORCID: 0000-0001-7485-9262
dc.date.accessioned	2011-01-04T13:39:38Z
dc.date.available	2011-01-04T13:39:38Z
dc.date.issued	2003
dc.identifier.uri	https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/5363
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.subject	Adverse selection	en
dc.subject	social welfare	en
dc.subject	Insurance markets	en
dc.subject.ddc	332	en
dc.subject.classificationjel	G22	en
dc.subject.classificationjel	D80	en
dc.title	Mandatory pensions and the intensity of adverse selection in life insurance markets	en
dc.type	Article accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.contributor.editoruniversityother	Université de Toulouse;France
dc.description.abstracten	This article examines the impact of varying mandatory pensions on saving, life insurance, and annuity markets in an adverse selection economy. Under reasonable restrictions, we find unambiguous effects on market size, participation rates, and equilibrium prices. The degree of adverse selection, whether a market is active or inactive, and social welfare are analyzed.	en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlname	The Journal of risk and insurance
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol	70	en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue	3	en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate	2003
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages	527-548	en
dc.relation.isversionofdoi	http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1539-6975.t01-1-00063	en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivate	oui	en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisher	Wiley	en
dc.subject.ddclabel	Economie financière	en

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