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dc.contributor.authorVilleneuve, Bertrand
HAL ID: 745441
ORCID: 0000-0001-7485-9262
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-04T14:08:24Z
dc.date.available2011-01-04T14:08:24Z
dc.date.issued2000
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/5367
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectasymmetric informationen
dc.subjectinsurance marketsen
dc.subjectvalue of informationen
dc.subjectmultidimensional signalingen
dc.subjectinformed principalen
dc.subject.ddc338.5en
dc.subject.classificationjelD82en
dc.subject.classificationjelG22en
dc.titleThe consequences for a monopolistic insurance firm of evaluating risk better than customers : The adverse selection hypothesis reverseden
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenThis article models a situation in which a monopolistic insurer evaluates risk better than its customers. The resulting equilibrium allocations are compared to the consequences of the standard adverse selection hypothesis. On the positive side, they exhibit the property that low-risk people are better covered than higher-risk people. On the normative side, the article shows that there are two reasons for avoiding excessive risk classification: one is the classical destruction of insurance possibilities, and the other comes from the distrustful atmosphere generated by new asymmetric information.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameThe Geneva Risk and Insurance Review
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol25en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2000
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages65-79en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008749524517en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherPalgrave Macmillanen
dc.subject.ddclabelMicroéconomieen


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