Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorEttinger, David
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-12T12:21:10Z
dc.date.available2011-01-12T12:21:10Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/5447
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectBudget-constraintsen
dc.subjecttoeholdsen
dc.subjectexternalitiesen
dc.subjectallocationen
dc.subjectrevenueen
dc.subjectauctionsen
dc.subject.ddc338.5en
dc.subject.classificationjelG32en
dc.subject.classificationjelD62en
dc.subject.classificationjelD44en
dc.titleBidding among friends and enemies with symmetric informationen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherUniversité de Cergy-Pontoise;France
dc.description.abstractenWe consider an auction setting, in a symmetric information framework, in which bidders, even if they fail to obtain the good, care about the price paid by the winner. We prove that the outcome of the first-price auction is not affected by identity-independent price externalities, while the outcome of the second-price auction is. In contrast, identity-dependent price externalities affect the outcome of both auction formats. In any case, the second-price auction exacerbates the effects of price externalities.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameJITE : Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol166en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue2en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2010
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages365-385en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1628/093245610791342996en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherMohr Siebecken
dc.subject.ddclabelMicroéconomieen


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record