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On Equilibria when Agents Have Multiple Priors

dc.contributor.authorDana, Rose-Anne
HAL ID: 12658
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-12T15:10:20Z
dc.date.available2011-01-12T15:10:20Z
dc.date.issued2002
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/5456
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectequilibriaen
dc.subjectpriorsen
dc.subject.ddc332en
dc.subject.classificationjelC11en
dc.titleOn Equilibria when Agents Have Multiple Priorsen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenWe discuss the existence and the qualitative properties of equilibria when agents have multiple priors and there is only one good in each state of the world. We first prove a general existence result in infinite dimension economies. We then fully describe the equilibria in two special cases. We first consider the case of CEU maximizers that have same capacities. We next consider the case of no aggregate uncertainty. We prove that if agents have non-random initial endowments and are uncertainty averse and maximize the minimal expected utility according to a set of possible priors, then the existence of a common prior is equivalent to the existence of a unique equilibrium, the no-trade equilibrium. We lastly give a mild assumption for indeterminacy of equilibria and compute the dimension of indeterminacy.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameAnnals of Operations Research
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol114en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue1-4en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2002
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages105-115en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1021006118400en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherSpringeren
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie financièreen


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